| Title:
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PARADOXES OF BELIEF AND STRATEGIC RATIONALITY
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| By: |
Robert C. Koons, Brian Skyrms, Ernest W. Adams |
| Format: |
Hardback |
| List price:
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£75.00 |
| Our price: |
£65.63 |
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£9.37 |
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| ISBN 10: |
0521412692 |
| ISBN 13: |
9780521412698 |
| Availability: |
Usually dispatched within 1-3 weeks.
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| Stock: |
Currently 0 available |
| Publisher: |
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS |
| Pub. date: |
31 January, 1992 |
| Series: |
Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory |
| Pages: |
192 |
| Description: |
This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory. |
| Synopsis: |
This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of liar-like paradoxes including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxical statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides an understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices and institutions. |
| Illustrations: |
5 b/w illus. |
| Publication: |
UK |
| Imprint: |
Cambridge University Press |
| Returns: |
Returnable |